Lord Judd: My Lords, does my noble friend accept that there is a great deal of positive feeling about the way in which the Government have made development issues central to the political agenda? Does she agree that the Commission for Africa chaired by the Prime Minister made the point that poverty is not only to be assessed in terms of sickness, shelter and all the other indices but also in terms of exclusion from political influence in the world? Is there not a major task to be tackled in ensuring that at a time when we talk about democracy and its importance in the world we make the international institutions of the UN and other international institutions more accountable to the poor of the world and enable them to be fuller stakeholders in establishing the agendas of those institutions?

Baroness Amos: My Lords, the Government see it as our responsibility to report on the commitments and pledges that we have made rather than on the commitments and pledges made by the Make Poverty History campaign. Members of that campaign will themselves report on the progress that they make as a coalition in challenging governments globally to meet those concerns. The noble Lord will know that this Government have taken a different approach. We want to work in partnership with developing country governments. We want there to be a very clear recognition of rights and responsibilities on both sides. We monitor progress against the commitments that we have made but also against the commitments that developing countries have made.

Baroness Amos: My Lords, I do not agree with the noble Earl. A series of goals were agreed by the international community in 2000, including halving world poverty by 2015. We will not meet those goals, particularly on the continent of Africa, without more resources and aid going in or without dealing with issues such as trade and debt relief. The majority of countries have not reached 0.7 per cent; in fact only four countries have reached 0.7 per cent of GNI. To enable us to put in more resources we must find another way of doing that. That is precisely what the IFF is there to do.

Lord Whitty: My Lords, the Government are very much in favour of developing biofuels of all sorts, including bioethanol, which among other feed stocks could use sugar beet. The House will know that we are already under discussion about whether we could introduce a road transport renewables obligation, which would help to kick-start a serious market in biofuels for transport. Sugar beet producers, among others, should benefit from that.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My noble friend agrees with that and I am sure that noble Lords will have read most, if not all of it. We are fully committed to a referendum; we have made that clear. It is important that the people of this country debate the issues, not least due to the misinformation that has been put around about the treaty. Whether they read all of the document or not—I am not sure that sending it to every household would meet peoples' requirements—we want to ensure that there is an opportunity to understand what a good treaty this is, how important it is and what a good job Britain has done.

Lord Grenfell: My Lords, perhaps we may return to the Question. I am not in the habit of leaking the deliberations of the European Union Select Committee, but we looked closely yesterday at Clause 2 of the European Union Bill. We came to the unanimous conclusion that an initiative for a decision, under Article IV-444 should have the approval of both Houses of Parliament. Will the Government take the time that is now available to them before the Bill comes to the House to reflect very carefully on that?

Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, of course I hope that fairly soon we will have a different government, so that none of this may arise. However, if, by some mischance, the noble Baroness' colleagues are still in office when the Bill comes forward again, would it not be reasonable to convey to her colleagues that we have a bicameral, not a unicameral system, and that your Lordships' House should not be treated as a second-rate think tank to be consulted on these matters? Should it not go through the proper processes of full approval by both Chambers of our Parliament?

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I recognise that that is the noble Lord's view. My view is that the will of the people will be that we will, indeed, be the Government, come 5 May, and that we will be debating these important issues in your Lordships' House—due to the importance of our role within Europe and the importance of ratifying this treaty. I have made it clear in all of my answers that there will be an opportunity for your Lordships to debate the Government's proposal.
	I reiterate that we are a unique bicameral institution. Twelve member states have bicameral parliaments, but none has a wholly unelected Chamber, such as ours. We must ensure that we put forward a single view. Our proposal is in the Bill, it will come to your Lordships' House, it will be debated and I am sure that your Lordships will make their views well-known. We all look forward to those debates.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, is the Minister aware that when my noble colleague and friend Lord McNally saw this Question on the passerelle procedure, with the strength of the excellent French that he learnt at school, he asked why the European Union was so concerned about umbrellas?
	In view of the excellent report from another place, published only a few weeks ago about strengthening links between the two Houses in the scrutiny of European business and the potential establishment of a parliamentary European committee, does the Minister not agree that this is another area in which the two Houses should be working together, rather than pursuing the Commons on its own and leaving the Lords, which does excellent and detailed work on European scrutiny, out of the picture?

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord put his noble friend right on parapluie. It is important that the two Houses work together. We are describing an approach on how we would achieve that. I am sure that the noble Lord will make his views well known during the passage of the Bill.
	We believe that our proposal does give your Lordships' House the opportunity to make its views well known and I hope that we will reach agreement, either through the usual channels or through our discussions and debates. When one looks in particular at the whole question of secondary legislation, the powers of your Lordships' House and so on, we have said that if we are to deal with these issues, it must, in the end, be another place that makes the final decision.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I recognise the noble Lord's strength of feeling, but the matter is straight forward. Twenty-five nation states are now involved in the European Union. It is important that if decisions are to be made on changing the voting system, 25 parliaments should make the decision, but not 25 parliaments plus 12 second houses. One has to obtain 25 nation-state views. If, in your Lordships' House and another place, an agreed view comes forward, these issues will not arise.
	However, the noble Lord will know well that, when we deal with secondary legislation, your Lordships' House can put forward its view and the Government will respond and listen—but at the end of the day, we could end up in a position where we had two different views. It is eminently possible for that to apply. It is the Government's view, put forward in the Bill, that it is important that one view comes forward, because one view, mixed with the other 24 views from 24 other parliaments, must prevail.

Baroness Amos: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.Moved, That Standing Order 41 (Arrangement of the Order Paper) be suspended until the end of the Session so far as is necessary to give Her Majesty's Government the power to arrange the order of business; and that Standing Orders 43 (Postponement and advancement of business) and 47 (No two stages of a Bill to be taken on one day) be suspended for the same period.—(Baroness Amos.)

Lord Bradshaw: My Lords, I realise that this may not be of great interest to many people, but I think that the matter before us is extremely important.
	The amendment relates to the powers of the passenger transport executives, which were created in 1968 by a late and lamented Member of the House, Barbara Castle. Since that time, the passenger transport executives have been parties to agreements to provide train services in their areas. The aim of the amendment is to keep that arrangement in place. In the Railways Bill, the Government are proposing that the passenger transport executives will lose their powers as co-signatories of franchise agreements, even though they are expected to be funders of the services involved.
	I cannot understand why the Government are protesting at the amendment. At first, when the PTEs were left out, we thought that that was an oversight, but it strikes me as an absolute contradiction for a Government who have said that they are in favour of regional government and in favour of letting powers be exercised locally to take away from the bodies that they created the power to be co-signatories to an agreement to which they contribute financially.
	I have tried hard to deal with the objections raised in Grand Committee and on Report by the Minister; namely, that on one or two occasions passenger transport executives have delayed signatures for what could be described as political reasons. We have imported into the amendment the fact that the passenger transport executive authorities will, when the agreement is presented to them, have 60 days in which to be co-signatories.
	The PTEs believe that the powers are important because, if they are not co-signatories, their power will be taken away, and the franchisee will take little notice of them. They will cease to be, as it were, a material part of the agreement.
	I do not intend to delay the House long. The provision is a fundamental flaw in the Bill. I do not think I have ever had so many messages from people of every political opinion saying that something was wrong and that it needed to be changed. Unless we get a satisfactory answer from the Minister, it will be necessary to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

Viscount Astor: My Lords, we supported the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, when he moved the amendment on Report, but we had some concerns, as some PTEs are better than others. The noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, has taken on board our concerns and added Amendment No. 2 to the group, which means that PTEs cannot hold up any franchise agreements. There is a 60-day period. We believe that that is an important change and I thank the noble Lord for making it so that we can fully support the amendment. Quite frankly, I am somewhat baffled by the Minister's position. I thought that his party believed in improving local representation not in diminishing their rights.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, in Committee, I detailed a number of examples regarding PTEs and other past difficulties. I am not emphasising this as the cardinal point of our argument. I am not saying that the purpose of the debate is to attack the PTEs on their past record, although clearly at times the exercise of their power has caused difficulty in the signing of franchises against a background where delays cost money.
	The noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, says that delays should be limited to 60 days. We have a problem with the definition of 60 days because it is not clear from his amendment where the 60 days begins. We have to be absolutely precise in law about when the clock starts ticking. I am afraid that I must convey that we do not think his amendment is specific enough in that regard.
	I am objecting to the principle—that delay costs money. Of course having a limit of 60 days would reduce the ability of the PTEs to create delay. That would not alter the fact that delays could occur over that period of time. Delays in signing such contracts are costly and the cost would be borne by the taxpayer. Who is responsible to the taxpayer? Not the PTEs, but the Secretary of State. That is why the Bill is constructed as it is. So, we are not clear that the 60-day part of the amendment produces significant benefits. We merely see dangers attached to it.
	The phrase used is "when the agreement is being finalised". If the franchise agreement has been finalised, why would the PTEs need 60 days to consider whether they wish to sign? As the terms would be clear at that stage, the only reason could conceivably be if they wished to re-open negotiations in order to secure further concessions. To reach the signature stage and then to seek to start negotiations again would be totally inconsistent with an efficient, cost-effective franchising process.
	In many ways I think that the amendment makes the situation worse than is the current system. At present, although PTEs might use the threat of delay to lever out advantages, no PTE would think that they could legally refuse to sign for two months. The amendment would give them precisely that power.
	The amendment also does not change the fact that PTEs could use their co-signatory status during the course of the franchise. That would lever in very significant power. We do not deny the contribution that the PTEs can make to the development of an effective rail system. We recognise—it is in the Bill—that the Secretary of State is involved in consultation with PTEs, before he establishes his position regarding a franchise, in order to take account of their position. But that is very different from the concept of co-signatory status.

Lord Bradshaw: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his reply; I find it totally unsatisfactory. He protesteth rather too much this afternoon. Yesterday afternoon, we invited the Minister to consider the amendment and suggest alternative phraseology but I assume that there is a time during the negotiation of a franchise when the document is ready. We are saying that there should be 60 days during which the Secretary of State, the PTE and the franchisee, whomever he happens to be, will sign it. Obviously, in any such period, there will be room for further negotiation; there always is.
	To pretend that 60 days is a long time when some franchises have taken three or more years to finalise is nonsense. I am sure that many Members of the House find it very difficult to give that credence. If we carry the amendment, there will be an opportunity for that to be revisited. I do not think that presents a great difficulty. The Minister should reflect on the fact that we will give the PTEs something from the Bill; whereas I fear that, in his words, "such resources as the Secretary of State may devote to the railways" may leave the PTEs at the very sticky end of the wicket: they will be called on to close down services in their areas without any power to do anything about that and the Secretary of State will shuffle the responsibility on to them, because they will be the part-funding authority.
	I have long experience of the matter. The PTEs are a power for good. I beg to test the opinion of the House.

Viscount Astor: My Lords, it is disappointing at this late stage of a Bill, and this Parliament, that we have been unable to come to an agreement on this issue. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, has been as helpful as he can, but I am afraid that his colleagues down the other end have not been so obliging.
	My amendment protects the rights of private-sector investors, passenger and freight operators, in the railway industry who could be aversely affected by cuts in spending imposed by the Secretary of State, if those cuts diminish the value of their existing rights under access contracts or cause them to face impossible or more onerous conditions in fulfilling their franchise agreements.
	Under the Bill, the Secretary of State has the power to set network outputs—the things that the network must be and the things that it must be able to do in terms of capacity or its condition. The Bill removes that power from the independent Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) and gives it to the Secretary of State. It does so because the Government wish to reassert complete control over spending on the railway. The problem is that in setting the network outputs in that way the Secretary of State may, due to a cash squeeze from the Treasury, have to put the network into decline. We all know what happened during the days of nationalisation.
	If the Secretary of State exercises that power and the network gets worse—for example, to the extent that it can accommodate fewer trains or they must go slower because of speed restrictions related to the condition of the track, or something like that—it could cause serious difficulties for existing private-sector operators. The value of their rights under existing contracts—I stress that we are talking about existing contracts, not future ones—could be diminished, perhaps materially.
	Freight operators could find that the maintenance burden on their rolling stock goes up, or that they must use more trains to provide the service levels to which they are committed under their contracts with commercial customers. Passenger operators may find themselves in a bind, with an obligation under their franchise agreements to produce certain outputs in terms of frequency, reliability, punctuality and overcrowding levels on trains, but unable to do so because the network is being cut back. Alternatively, it could be more expensive because to do so their resources need to be increased just to stand still and to provide the agreed level of service under their contract.
	None of those things would be the fault of either the freight or passenger operators concerned. The network getting worse because the Treasury has decided that it should be so can hardly be blamed on private-sector operators just trying to do their jobs, so they should not be penalised.
	On 9 February 2004, at the start of the rail review, the Secretary of State promised that those adverse consequences would not be visited upon private-sector operators, but I am afraid that that is exactly what the Bill does. For those reasons, my amendment provides essential protection in these limited but potentially very serious circumstances for private-sector operators.
	I stress again that the amendment protects only existing contractual rights. What contracts operators may enter into in the future, once they have seen how the regulatory and operating environment has been changed by the Bill, is another matter that is not affected by my amendment. We are concerned about the rights of existing operators, and that they should not be assaulted or trampled on by the Bill.
	The Minister said at an earlier stage that his department was working to develop access contracts and the network code to provide protections of the kind that the amendment seeks to establish. But there is a problem: the ORR can change the network code, which is part of every access contract, in a way that could diminish the protections and rights to compensation to operators when cutbacks are made. It has that right. If it exercises that right, it has no obligation to provide any redress or compensation for those who lose out as a result. If that happens—and I know that the ORR is coming under considerable pressure to make changes of that kind—the Minister's assurance that he kindly gave us in Committee will have no effect because operators' rights will already have been diminished. They need more than assurances which have, I am afraid, no bite.
	The Minister has helpfully said that the Government accept that franchise agreements would need to be varied in the event of inadequate funding being available for outputs for the network, should the level of services operated by the franchisees be made undeliverable. That is helpful, but it does not go as far as it needs to.
	It does not cover the case, which is much more likely than the service being impossible to deliver, of it being more expensive or more difficult to deliver the contracted service. The Government have so far shown no inclination to allow such amendments into the template franchise agreements, which are now being put to the private sector. The Minister will not accept that that protection should be wider than he has proposed or that it should be in the Bill. We believe that it should be both of those things.
	The alternative offered by the Minister's department is the inevitable judicial review. What a prospect: what a deterrent—judicially reviewing the Minister; the same Minister you rely on for your contract and for its eventual renewal when the result will not be known until long after the contract has expired. There is the uncertainty and the huge expense. The other alternative offered by the Minister's department was litigation in the courts. That, too, is expensive and uncertain, and the process takes a long time. It can easily take three or four years, which is probably well beyond the unexpired life of a contract.
	In offering those alternatives, the department appears plainly to accept that the operators need redress or relief in the circumstances contemplated by the amendment. But rather than dealing with the acknowledged problem here with clarity, certainty and finality, it favours long, drawn-out litigation.
	I believe that we should all be looking at the Bill to prevent people from having to go to court, not encouraging them into litigation by passing bad legislation. My amendment will help to ensure that the Secretary of State behaves in a reasonable manner and respects the private rights of investors in the industry. Of course, if no cuts are made to the funding of the rail network, which could cause these serious adverse effects to the operators, there will be no need for this process. It is there as a protection if the Treasury gets its way and forces budget cuts.
	Without this change, private sector contractors will find their rights and protections diminished. There would be a very costly knock-on effect in the future as anyone contemplating taking on a franchise or an access contract to run any kind of service—whether passenger or freight—will have to build in a huge margin, just in case. So it will eventually cost the taxpayer.
	The Minister accused me on Monday, at Report stage, of asking the Secretary of State to sign a blank cheque. That is simply not true. My amendment relates only to the unexpired part of rail franchise and access contracts. I say again: it does not affect in any way future contracts. I think that the Minister now accepts that. In future contracts, if so inclined, the Secretary of State—in the case of franchises—and the ORR—in the case of access contracts and the network code—can ensure that they contain output adjustment mechanisms which avoid the need to compensate the operator in the future.
	My amendment ensures that if the Secretary of State changes the circumstances in which the contract has been set, and does not allow those affected relief under their contracts, he must allow changes to their contracts. He must compensate them or he must not do it. The choice will be his. The Secretary of State can avoid that happening by treating the operators fairly. He does not have to cut the network, but if he does he must recognise that existing private sector rights must be honoured and protected. There is no blank cheque, but just a simple, straightforward protection.
	My amendment is about fairness. It protects and gives confidence to those who invest in rail. Most importantly, it will benefit the poor, long-suffering passengers who are often overlooked in this debate. I beg to move.

Lord Berkeley: My Lords, my name is added to this amendment. I shall not detain the House because the noble Viscount has set out very succinctly the purpose of the amendment. It would protect train operators, including freight—I declare an interest as chairman of the Rail Freight Group—against government action that adversely affects their business. It is quite simple and is quite a normal principle.
	On Monday, at Report stage, my noble friend basically made two points. The first was that this matter could be resolved by using the network code, which was prepared and run by the independent Office of Rail Regulation. Comfort should be taken that this office was independent. The second point was that the Government did not like to see the word "compensation" in the Bill.
	Perhaps I may remind the House that on both of those issues the recently published Crossrail Bill does precisely what my noble friend said should not be in this Bill. The Crossrail Bill seeks to fetter very significantly the independence of the rail regulator by allowing the Secretary of State to instruct or direct him to give priority to one group of train operators over another, which would very seriously and adversely affect those who might have to have their access contracts changed. If one accepts that, it is reassuring that the Government have chosen to put in that Bill the fact that those people adversely affected should be capable of receiving compensation.
	So compensation is accepted for Crossrail, but it is not apparently accepted for the rest of the railway. Even more seriously, it demonstrates that one cannot rely long-term on the Government accepting that the rail regulator office should remain independent, which is one of the absolute foundations of the private railway network today. Whether people like privatised railways or not, that is what we have. The Office of Rail Regulation ensures that private sector interests, which have invested billions in the railways, should be able to enjoy the benefit of their investment without subsequent interference from the Government.
	Both of the arguments put forward by my noble friend should be treated with caution if the Government are prepared to change them so soon. This amendment is a very important part of the comfort that private-sector investors in the railways need if they are to invest with confidence in the future.

Lord Bradshaw: My Lords, I am pleased to associate these Benches with the remarks made by the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, and the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley. We are very keen that nothing should stand in the way of people's appetites for investment. That applies particularly to the freight sector, which, as I said at Report stage, is so vital and for which—I do not expect to treatise on that now—the Government have done very little to deal with the huge problem of congestion on the roads. I am pleased to support the amendment.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate on an issue that we considered in more general terms probably at Report stage. I congratulate the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, on having refined his amendment and for concentrating his comments on the real issues at stake.
	I am well aware of and, of course, understand the concern of the train operators regarding the potential impact of any future access charges review on their businesses. I recognise the validity of concern expressed by all three noble Lords who have contributed to this debate.
	As we have stated previously, the Government are keen to provide operators with the certainty that they will receive mitigation or compensation should their businesses be affected by these processes. We have made public an exchange of letters between the Secretary of State and the Office of Rail Regulation to that effect. So the debate on the amendment comes down to clear points of principle.
	First, we believe—not, as I think was suggested, that compensation should not be offered in proper circumstances—that compensation and mitigation are matters which should be dealt with through the access contracts. That is why we continue to work with the industry to ensure that access contracts and the network code deal as effectively as possible with these issues. If we accepted the amendment, it would bring legislation into an area where the existing contractual arrangements are working well and are clearly understood by the parties. It would be wrong to do this in principle and would set a dangerous precedent that could undermine the commercial stability sought by private sector operators and investors, which was the burden of the remarks made by all three noble Lords.
	But the second point of principle is one which I sought to emphasise on Report. Again I address it to all parts of the House, but I suppose that I am bound to address it particularly to my noble friend. It is for the Secretary of State and for Scottish Ministers to determine how much they are willing and able to spend in support of railway services. No statutory requirement should be added to that budget subsequent to their decisions. While I recognise my noble friend's defence of the interests he represents so ably—he has every right to do so—I ask him to accept that we are debating this at a point when the nation is about to decide in a general election who should be its representatives, and that Members of the other place are now putting their own positions on the line. I would also ask him and other noble Lords to consider whether it is right that a budget established by the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers in their area should be increased by statute in circumstances over which they would have no direct control? Surely that goes against the fundamental democratic position of accountability. That ought to be borne in mind by all of us in this House who do not have to stand for election in order to reach our judgments on this issue, one that concerns funding and resources for which the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers are responsible.
	I turn to the second argument put forward by the noble Viscount, Lord Astor. This refined amendment would come into effect only in limited circumstances and would cover only the difference between what would be paid under the contract and what is adequate so that the risk to the Government is not that great. I would argue that we do not know what the risk would be. The amendment establishes the principle that the Secretary of State is open to having his budget extended, and we do not know what the circumstances might be and therefore the sums involved in terms of compensation.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, my noble friend must be a little careful with the concept of contingency funding. I can think of certain expenditures from the contingency fund of hugely significant proportions for government, so I am not sure that that concept can be translated to legislation in quite the rather facile way he suggests.
	We maintain that the contracts should be signed and the work done on the basis of understanding aspects of risk. Built into that is proper consideration of when things might go wrong. But the idea of having a kind of sinking fund created by the Secretary of State with taxpayers' money available to be dipped into and shelled out under ill-defined circumstances is one that I am surprised to see my noble friend supporting. But I am even more surprised that the Conservative Party, on the brink of a general election in which they are spending so much time showing how proper their candidates must be about public expenditure plans, is actually promoting an amendment that is an open-ended demand on a Secretary of State.
	I hope that the noble Viscount will recognise the wisdom of withdrawing his amendment and accept that the Government's provisions adequately meet the situation.

Lord Wedderburn of Charlton: My Lords, I hope it will be acceptable to your Lordships that something more should be said on this clause and on this part of the Bill. The way the matter fell in Committee—the marshalling of the amendments and the way in which they were, for the most part, not moved on this clause—was something on which I sought advice. I appreciated, perhaps rather later than I should, that the only way for the Government to say a little more about this matter was for me to put down the amendment on the Marshalled List, which I shall duly dispatch in the expected manner. This is an important matter because there is hardly a more serious deprivation of liberty than being the subject of lawful arrest.
	I appreciate, too, that the law is in rather a mess. Fundamentally, it was not my understanding that the Government really had to adopt the option which they did in relation to it. Looking back over our Second Reading debate and at the extensive debate in Committee in another place, from which one could hardly say a complete consensus emerged, I have to admit that I—and not only I but various experts in the field who have spoken to me about this—was rather surprised that this was not a matter which could have been left over for another Parliament, when I think we would have had a much closer and prolonged debate on it. The calendar, of course, is in the Government's arrangement, and certain parts of the Bill have been left aside because they are controversial. One of the points about putting this amendment down is that the Government may find, as time goes along, that the new pattern of powers to arrest is rather more controversial than they appreciated.
	The two matters raised in Clause 110 are the powers of a police constable to arrest and the citizen's power of lawful arrest, without a warrant in each case. I touch briefly on the basic matters: we are abolishing the distinction between arrestable and non-arrestable offences. We are introducing a power for the constable lawfully to arrest without a warrant anyone who is about to commit an offence. That specifically includes any offence whenever committed, someone who is in the act of committing an offence or suspected of being about to commit an offence and where there are reasonable grounds for believing that an offence has been committed, so long as it is necessary to arrest the person in question. New Section 24(5)(e) provides that that includes allowing the prompt and effective investigation of the offence or—and I stress the disjunction—the conduct of the person in question. It deals not merely with the investigation of offence but investigation of conduct.
	Commentary on this matter has already begun in the journals. I am sure that the Government understand that that is there. I should like to refer to just one of the articles which are appearing and are about to appear. Professor Spencer of Cambridge, an ex-colleague of mine, who is not to be lightly brushed off as some extravagant gadfly on the law and is a very serious authority, has suggested that,
	"the power to arrest will be limited, in theory, in that it will 'only' arise if one of a list of conditions is present. But the limitation is illusory, because the list contains 11 items, one of which is 'to allow the prompt and effective investigation of the offence or the conduct of the person in question'. It will be a rare case indeed in which one of these conditions"—
	such as that one—"does not exist".
	Although Professor Spencer agrees that it is desirable for us to move forward and modernise, as the Home Office has put it, the law on arrest, both for constables and non-constable citizens, he questions seriously whether the Government's position on the matter is right in any respect. Having read all the proceedings, I have not really found a clear statement of the justification for moving at such speed and in such a direction on this matter. I therefore offer the Government an opportunity of saying something fundamental on the issue.
	For instance, Professor Spencer says that the Government have promised that,
	"after the Bill is passed, it will put limits on the . . . powers of the police by issuing a new code of practice".
	But, he says, this is deeply unsatisfactory:
	"What the government is telling Parliament, in effect, is this: 'Vote to extend police powers now—and trust us to impose some limits afterwards'".
	That is put in the manner in which the author normally puts his points—rather directly.
	He continues:
	"In a democracy that respects the rule of law, the limits of coercive powers like these should be laid down in primary legislation, not in codes, written and rewritten as each new Home Secretary sees fit".
	On the brink of an election, the power of the last words is immediate.
	It is difficult to understand what traumatic damage to the social fabric would have been caused if a reform of this area of the law, which everyone agrees needs rethinking, had been left for a short or medium term in which much more profound debate could take place. With great respect to the other place, which spent some time on this issue on 18 January, one cannot think that all the corners of what is a vast territory were touched.
	Of course, similar criticisms are being made about the citizen's power of arrest. The new citizen's power of arrest for any offence will include one where the person is in the act of committing an indictable offence:
	"Anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be committing an indictable offence",
	or guilty of an indictable, offence and it is necessary to arrest the person.
	Professor Spencer offers some thoughts on that new power, which goes far beyond breach of the peace and the like, in saying that,
	"the Bill proposes to extend the existing power to cover all indictable offences, and limit the power,
	of the non-constable,
	"for the suspect to be restrained or detained. For the citizen out of uniform, this new package would be as obscure and unhelpful as the present law. Unless they have law degrees, 'have-a-go heroes' do not know which offences are indictable, and which are not—
	or indeed—
	"which ones are punishable by five years' imprisonment".
	He suggests that this particular reform will create a great deal of danger for people who think that they can operate their powers as a non-constable citizen.
	Therefore, I wish to raise two issues with the Government. The first that I have raised is why push this particular package through? My understanding, and my noble friend will correct me if I am wrong, is that the review of the PACE statutory powers did not require the Government to adopt this option. It is their choice and a great number of technical problems arise other than those that I have mentioned.
	Secondly, it seems very strange for the power of arrest to cover all offences, serious or trivial. I understand what my noble friend on the Front Bench said in Committee. She said that the Government will come out with the new code of practice,
	"so there will be an opportunity for debates and consideration of those issues".—[Official Report, 5/4/05; col. 639.]
	Those are the issues that were raised in connection with the power of arrest. I should have thought that such a fundamental issue as deprivation of liberty without breach of the law on the part of the person doing it would have required fundamental debate of all the issues, including the necessity of the arrest—of which particular criticisms can be made, whatever the code of conduct—before the legislation went on the statute book.
	I do not see how it would be a breach of any of the Government's obligations. Was this a manifesto commitment? It does not seem to have been. Why push this through now? We know that parts of this Bill are not being pushed through now because they are controversial. The fact that people in the other place and here have not spotted the controversy is not now open to the Government because I am pointing it out to them. This is very controversial: it will be controversial in the literature and in practice.
	There is a final point which authors are raising immediately. Academics are allowed to raise points these days about ordinary people—they are rather ordinary people, especially academic lawyers. They are saying, with some seriousness, that the relationship between the police and ordinary people in the public is precious. If the new powers are more likely to give rise to mistakes—and I have every sympathy with someone who has to exercise them and avoid mistakes—surely it should have beenargued out in much greater detail and not put into the calendar of the general election. It is not really suitable to be rushed through.
	That expresses a strong view of my own, but I rely on those writers who are writing about the matter rather more critically than the Government have yet appreciated. Naturally, I look forward to the response of my noble friend on the Front Bench and hope that she will give us some rather better reasons for what has been done. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I am happy to give a fuller explanation and I am sorry that we are doing that so late in the day.
	The proposals in Clause 110 focus on simplifying the current complex array of arrest powers which has developed since the introduction of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act over two decades ago. My noble friend was right to raise the issue of the review because we think that the provisions reflect one of the primary recommendations of the review of PACE carried out in November 2002 by the Cabinet Office and the Home Office in consultation with stakeholders.
	The review recognised the need for greater clarity and definition of arrest powers. It made a number of suggested changes around definition and lists of offences, but the more substantive recommendation was for more radical ideas about expanding the scope to arrest and to consult on those proposals. That is what we have done. The consultation paper on modernising police powers, published last autumn, set out this new approach which simplifies, both for the police and the public, the powers of arrest but which, importantly, also maintains key safeguards and protections for the public. We understand and are aware of the need for safeguards and protection.
	In doing so, we have sought to enable the ability of the arresting officer to consider the individual circumstances of each case—to look at the needs of the victim, the nature of the offence, the requirements of the criminal justice system and the circumstances of the offender. This is where the concept comes in.
	Section 25 of PACE currently provides a constable with a general power of arrest for any offence. In making use of the power, a constable is required to consider the conditions set out in the Act and is required to make a judgment in each case. The framework powers of arrest for arrestable and serious arrestable offences under Section 24 of PACE remove the arbitrary decision on whether arrest is possible, but it still remains a decision of the officer on the street whether or not there are legitimate grounds to exercise that power. The necessity test would raise the level of accountability of the arresting officer in each individual arrest situation and minimise the ability for arbitrary interference.
	During the passage of this Bill, both in this House and in the other place, concerns have, as my noble friend rightly said, been raised that extending the power of arrest to all offences might lead to a significant rise in the numbers of arrests being made as people are arrested for minor crimes. We are not suggesting that the seriousness of the offence is not a consideration when a constable decides to make an arrest. But it is not the sole consideration. Rather it is just one of a number of necessary factors which should be taken into account.
	However, these powers must be proportionate to the offence. That is why we are producing a new PACE code of practice on arrest which will amplify the reasons justifying an arrest of a person. The code will be drafted in consultation with a range of stakeholders and will be subject to the draft affirmative parliamentary process.
	As my noble friend identified, this clause also deals with the powers of arrest for persons who are not constables by inserting a new power into PACE in Section 24A. Similarly, we are looking to provide clarity in this area by indicating that a person other than a constable may arrest in those circumstances where it is necessary to prevent harm or injury, loss or damage to property or the person is making off before a constable can assume responsibility. Additionally, the person must be satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable for a constable to make the arrest instead. All of those are within the ken of the normal, average citizen.
	In the other place, we tabled an amendment that the so-called "citizen's power of arrest" was applicable only in relation to indictable offences. The amendment was tabled in response to concerns expressed during the public consultation exercise and in the other place that the citizen's power of arrest should not be extended to minor offences.
	The rationalisation of powers in this whole area represents a significant change to PACE and the framework of arrest. That is not done lightly nor without significant consideration that it improves and enhances the existing structure. We believe that it does and that view is supported by a large number of respondents to the public consultation exercise. We also believe that we are proposing a new structure that is proportionate and balances the needs of the police while protecting the rights of the individual.
	I hope that, given that full explanation, my noble friend will be content that the course that we have taken is appropriate. We shall have an opportunity to discuss the matter when it comes back by way of affirmative resolution. There will also be discussion with all the stakeholders, who, I am sure, will make their views on the provisions crystal clear.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: moved Amendment No. 15:
	Clause 120, leave out Clause 120

Baroness Harris of Richmond: My Lords, yesterday, I spoke at length about custody sergeants and the need for them to retain that substantive rank in custody suites. I return to this because the answers given by the Government were wholly unsatisfactory.
	None of the real concerns expressed in stringent terms by the police was addressed. I was deeply disappointed to hear that the Conservatives in another place have decided to accept the Government's position on nothing more than a promise that whoever is chosen to go into the custody suite will be well trained and held in sufficiently high esteem by their colleagues to perform their duties. What on earth does that mean? What does a person have to exhibit before he or she is deemed to be held in such high esteem? Who will watch over those new appointees and judge whether they will be suitable to hold people in custody—and, more, that they will be under the full power of PACE? Can the IPCC—the Independent Police Complaints Commission—investigate complaints against civilian custody officers? If so, how will that be publicised, so that a person held in custody will know that they have the protection of that law?
	I contacted the Police Superintendents' Association this morning and got its views. Thinking back to the time before the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—the time of Judges' Rules and so on—they remembered a time, as do I, when many abuses were carried out regarding the detention of suspects. PACE was necessary to codify what the police should and should not do with suspects. The linchpin of all that was that custody officers, who have protection in law for their decisions taken in support of the Act, were able to have the strength of the law behind them, even if it meant speaking out against senior investigating officers, who might want to interview a suspect against the requirements of PACE.
	The service respects that independence, and I was told that senior detectives had accepted custody officer's decisions when clearly they had been unpopular. The new provisions do not provide anything like the proper independent statutory role for this post. A member of police staff—a civilian custody officer—may not have the same authority with senior investigating officers as a police colleague would do. I am fearful that it will not be long before we reap the whirlwind that that might unleash.
	Custody, surely, is part of the investigative process. Many crimes have been detected in custody suites, and what I fear is behind the Bill is the aim that a custody suite will be enabled to be operated by a private company. I am sure that I do not need to elaborate on the problems that that might cause.
	Yesterday, I listed a range of important players in the police field who have expressed deep concern about this part of the Bill—bodies such as the Police Federation, the Police Superintendents' Association, Liberty, the Law Society, Centrex, and so on. Even at this late hour, I ask the Government to reconsider their position.
	Yesterday, the Minister told us that Customs officers and others had similar expertise. I should like to know how many people Customs officers "and others" have held in their custody and under what regulations. Were they subjected to PACE regulations, as well? When will all the training for those "other" people take place, and what happens in the lacuna before that training is completed? In my experience, different applications of training standards apply across the individual police forces, with the result that national standards are not always adhered to. Those standards ought to be crystal clear and certainly understood before the Bill is enacted. Who will be the independent evaluator of the pilot studies? Will we have the opportunity of seeing that evaluation and assessing for ourselves whether the pilots have been successful?
	It is simply not right to keep telling us that it is to be a new and different agency from traditional policing. It is still going to deal with crime. The whole area has been so badly thought out and flies in the face of such strong policing opposition that I hope that the Minister will reconsider her position on the use of civilians as custody officers. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I should underline very clearly that the Bill has been fully scrutinised in the other place. There was proper debate and anxious consideration of it. We have spent considerable time exploring the issues both on Second Reading and in Committee. Therefore, I shall not weary the House by repeating everything that I said yesterday in replying to the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, or in replying to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia. However, I should like to deal with a couple of points that they identified as being still of concern in relation to the IPPC.
	The noble Baroness asks what we are going to do about complaints regarding non-police officers who take up the role of custody officer. Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002, which set up the IPCC, gives the commission oversight of the investigation of complaints against police officers and police staff. In addition, noble Lords will know that, as now, police Authorities, as the employers of police staff, are liable for any wrongful acts committed by such staff. That will also be the case with civilian custody officers.
	Looking at the general position, I emphasise that the proposals in the Bill do not remove the ability for a police sergeant to continue in the role of custody officer. We very much recognise the contribution made by uniformed sergeants to the post and the effective and efficient operation of custody suites. We do not want to lose that experience or those skills. In the Bill we are providing a capability for others who have demonstrated that they have the appropriate skill to discharge this function to do so. I said yesterday, and I repeat, that there is provision for appropriate training before any individual could be entrusted with this role. We have spoken about Centrex's role and the guidance.
	I remind the House that PACE itself sets the benchmark for how an individual should be treated when detained in a custody suite after arrest. Those provisions will apply as strongly to any new custody officer as they have always applied to those who are detained.
	I appreciate the anxiety expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, and what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia. However, this is a new body. It will have to be properly integrated. I would not be surprised if in the first instance the majority, if not all, the custody officers who join SOCA come from the police. However, we are not putting in place provisions for what happens now, this year or next year but for the long-term development of the agency. Over time, a number of people will enter the agency who will be, or may be, fitted for that role by virtue of the experience of having worked within it. It is important for us to remember that.
	I say to the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, that there is no question of privatisation of the role of custody officer. We are talking here about enabling chief officers—I emphasise that—to appoint to that role police staff employed by the police authority. Therefore, there is no reason for there to be concern that somehow something will be inappropriately done.
	I hope that with that further explanation the noble Baroness will think it appropriate not to press her amendment.

Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, we have already heard some impressive speeches this afternoon. I immediately express my apology for not having been able to be present in Committee yesterday, but I was present at Second Reading. I feel extremely strongly about the issue, and I shall be brief.
	The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, and my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond have drawn attention to the fact that, in the Bill, there are a number of unrealised and insufficiently appreciated elements that will have a major effect in our society in years to come. One of them concerns demonstrations and whether they can be held within the ambit of Parliament Square and the areas that traditionally in this country have been the centres of demonstrations for many decades.
	Either on grounds of security—not necessarily justified—or even on arguments of tidiness, we are gradually seeing the colour and the vivacity of our democracy leeched out. Many of us are conscious that we live in a society that feels much less free than it did 10 or 15 years ago. We always have to ask whether it is necessary to take such steps. In these clauses, it is not necessary to do so. Let me say one or two quick words about that.
	Demonstrations are a crucial safety valve—a way in which our fellow citizens can express their indignation, anger or disgust at government policy. I say that about all governments at all times. It is crucial to allow our fellow citizens to demonstrate peacefully because, if we make that extremely difficult, sooner or later they will demonstrate non-peacefully. That is the lesson from many other societies.
	Let us look at the examples of two recent great demonstrations. Both were great credits to our democracy, and both saw Parliament as their target and the hub of their protest. The first was the great Iraq march, in which many of us took part. It brought home to the Government the extent to which many of our fellow citizens felt deeply concerned about that war and the arguments leading up to it. The second, from a very different part of the political spectrum, was the Countryside Alliance demonstration. It was widely rumoured in the press to be likely to get out of hand, but was actually conducted with extraordinary courtesy and restraint.
	It has been a credit to our democracy that, on both sides of the political spectrum, such demonstrations have been held, to the great admiration of many other parts of the world. It might be said by the Government, "There is no reason for you to object. After all, we are still going to permit demonstrations". However, they will be demonstrations so controlled and capricious that it would be very difficult for them to take place within the "designated area" with any degree of true freedom. I shall give three examples.
	First, the designated area is much wider than need be to protect the Houses of Parliament. It is simply ludicrous that the designated area as it stands—I am not clear exactly where it will run—includes almost all the areas of traditional demonstration in London, such as Whitehall, the Embankment and Parliament Square itself. Then there is a question about whether Trafalgar Square is in or out; it is certainly within a kilometre of the Houses of Parliament.
	Secondly, there is some uncertainty about the degree of notice required. Will it be six days except in exceptional circumstances, and how does one define those? Will the exceptional circumstances be widely recognised so that anyone dealing with a demonstration about a recent event—something new that has happened or an announcement by the Government—would be permitted to go ahead?
	Thirdly—this was hardly debated at all in Committee, and not debated much in the other place—huge uncertainty is constituted by Clauses 134 and 135, which are rather innocently described as supplementary provisions. If I understand them properly, they allow, amazingly, any "senior police officer"—defined as the most senior person in any group who happens to be present at the time, which often may be a constable or someone only a little more senior—to change, vary or add to the conditions. Those are the very conditions laid down by the commissioner of police that have required notice to be given.
	That is intolerable. It means that a decent organiser of a demonstration will not know until he is actually involved in it precisely what conditions have been met by those whom he has organised to take part in it. That would not be so serious were it not for the scale of the punishment that would be visited on him or her if he or she got it wrong or was unable to change what the demonstration did at what may be the very last moment. Those sentences include 51 weeks of custody or a level 4 fine—the kinds of punishment that we normally reserve for people who have committed some substantial crime in the ordinary world.
	Do we really want to put police officers in a position in which they vary and change conditions at such a high price to the genuine citizen taking part in a demonstration? That will gradually drive people away from the designated site altogether, which is far from desirable because—bluntly—it is important that Parliament feels in itself the anger and indignation of its fellow citizens and does not try to encapsulate itself from any such inconveniences. We worry about the gap between Parliament and the people; the Bill will widen that gap yet further, completely unnecessarily.
	In conclusion, all of us in the past few weeks have hugely admired the amazing demonstrations in the Ukraine against rigged elections, which went right up to the doors of the parliament and which brought about, totally non-violently, the change in the Ukrainian regime and the ushering in of genuine democracy. We have admired the demonstration of tens of thousands of people in the Lebanon, calling for the Syrians to leave. That was described, from the White House to 10 Downing Street, as a remarkable example of the great attempt to extend democracy to new parts of the world.
	How bizarre and how ironic it should be that those very things that we praised in the Lebanon, in the Ukraine, in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere, we are now beginning to make almost impossible in our own country. I would ask the Minister to think seriously about the implications if the Government's proposals, not only here, but also far beyond where British influence and British example have long been regarded as important. I beg to move.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, I shall speak briefly in support of my noble friend Lady Williams. I fear that this part of the Bill in particular gives such wide and discretionary powers to the police, and those to whom they are expressly given, as to create a dangerous regime. I should add to my noble friend's remarks that, for example, under Clause 136, a constable can arrest a single demonstrator in the belief that the demonstrator has not obtained the necessary authorisations.
	A demonstration could constitute a single person, because the Bill makes it clear that the demonstration can be by a someone who is merely shouting in the street—for example, when seeing someone leaving these Houses who that demonstrator feels passionately about in relation to the issue concerned. That individual will, if the provision is passed, be subject to immediate arrest by any policeman in the vicinity. That is not remotely right or sensible.
	If the Minister says that the police will of course exercise their discretion, it would underline my concern about the discretionary nature of these vast powers. Parliament is increasingly dealing with that type of legislation and it is bad legislation. I merely wished to say that and to support strongly the comments that have been made.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: To this extent, my Lords. We still passionately believe in the freedom of assembly and the freedom to demonstrate. We are proud, too, of the right, as the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, said, of the ability to assemble before Parliament to demonstrate before the elected Members.
	I should also like to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, that we similarly believe that great credit should be given to our democracy for that ability to protest. We do not believe that the controls that we put in place are capricious, as she fears; they have to be judiciously and reasonably exercised. It is incumbent on any commissioner who has this duty and capacity to exercise that power reasonably. As she knows, there are perfectly robust ways of ensuring that the proper exercise of that power is maintained and is not capriciously used. It will therefore be incumbent on the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to act reasonably. Therefore, it is putting the case far too high to suggest that it would be impossible for reasonable protest to continue.
	I remind the House that although it is reasonably understood, the concern that has been expressed is not justified. These clauses would require protesters to give prior notice of their protest to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. However, he or she is obliged—I emphasise that word—to authorise the demonstration. It will, however, be open to him or her to attach conditions to the authorisation where necessary; for example, to safeguard the operation of Parliament or to prevent a security risk in the area. "Necessary" is an important word. If you can combine necessity with reasonableness, then it is quite clear that the power would have to be judiciously and properly exercised.
	The Government believe that no point in the designated area may be more than one kilometre in a straight line from the point nearest to it in Parliament Square. I say straightaway to the noble Lord, Lord Monson, that I understand his preference to use the old ways of defining distance rather than metres. I have that prejudice myself. However, in this we have to move with the times, and it would be more appropriate to remain in kilometres.
	I can assure the House that the Government intend to lay an order on the precise area to be covered. We intend to consult with the Metropolitan Police on this area so that it covers the area where the demonstrations that disrupt the work of Parliament and hinder access to the House take place. In this Bill we do not want to restrict unnecessarily the area that will be covered.
	As I indicated yesterday, we are aware of concerns about the designated area taking in Trafalgar Square, a matter which has been raised in this House on a number of occasions. The House can be assured that in exercising the order-making power we shall ensure that Trafalgar Square is excluded. As a result, demonstrations could continue there without the need for prior notification from the commissioner.
	The nature of a demonstration may well change during the course of the demonstration, and as such it is entirely appropriate that the senior officer on the ground should be able to vary the conditions to reflect the changing conditions. That is already the case. Under the Public Order Act, in the case of processions, the senior officer on the scene could attach additional conditions in certain circumstances; for example, if there is a serious threat of disorder. So that is not a new change; it merely confirms the position that has existed for some time.
	I turn to the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, on timing. The Government have responded to the concerns expressed about the requirement to give at least six days' notice of any demonstration. In Committee yesterday, the House agreed an amendment that recognises that there should be provision for a shorter period of notice—24 hours—in exceptional circumstances. For example, a demonstration may be organised as a response to an event that could not be foreseen, precisely as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said. An important issue could spring up at very short notice and it would be important to demonstrate about it. This provision allows that to take place in a way that is proper.
	The Government believe that the notice period is an essential part of these provisions, so that the commissioner is able to consider the circumstances of the demonstration and its likely effect on the work of Parliament and the security of the area around it. He can then set conditions that are appropriate and proportionate. The Government have recognised that there may be occasions when demonstrations are organised as a response to events that, as I said, could not have been foreseen. We have therefore shortened the notice in response.
	So what we have done both on the ambit of the designated area and the notice period is to respond in what we hope is a positive and sensible way to the concerns that have been properly expressed. I make it clear that it is no part of the Government's intent to restrict the proper demonstrations that should continue to occur on those matters about which the public feel strongly. That is a fundamental part of our democracy, of which we are justly proud.

Lord Greaves: My Lords, I confess that I had intended saying a few brief things on the first amendment; that is, until I felt that the noble Baroness on the Government Front Bench was glowering at me too much. Then I would have sat down. This is probably a more appropriate time.
	This is not the most momentous Bill before the House in this wash-up. Some people may think that it is not very important and can therefore just be nodded through. In practice, the Bill may have a more direct effect on the lives of ordinary people than many of the far more momentous things that we talk about that might affect some people very greatly. This Bill will affect almost everybody. It is about the quality and the maintenance of their own neighbourhood, their own area, their own countryside and so forth.
	It is an important Bill. To that extent I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith. It is a real shame that we have been unable to go through it and worry out clause-by-clause how it will affect people in the streets, villages and so on, but we cannot, and that is all there is to it. Given that we cannot, it is right that the Bill should go through in its present form, particularly with the two or three helpful amendments that the Minister will move.
	The more I look at the British constitution and the way in which it works, the more I think that it is not so much pragmatic as a sort of Heath Robinson job held together by antiquated ceremonial—I do not include the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington of Ribbleton, in either of those descriptions.
	We have what we have in front of us. I, too, thank the Minister very much for the careful consideration and replies that he has given to all of us who raised perhaps more detailed questions at Second Reading than we might have done, knowing that we might get into this situation.
	The only issue on which I still have nagging doubts is the gating provisions and whether, particularly in areas such as Pennine towns and villages, they could be used to block off legitimate access to countryside walks and footpaths. That is the only set of answers given by the Minister that I am not too happy about, and I shall follow that up in correspondence later. Apart from that, we are here to do a job of work which will not take long. So let us get on with it.

On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 20, as amended, agreed to.
	Clauses 21 to 30 agreed to.
	On Question, Whether Clause 31 shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: My Lords, Defra is a very wide brief, and I have been immensely impressed by the way in which the Minister has mastered that brief with great diligence. I thank him for that. It is obvious to us all that his breadth of knowledge on the great variety of topics that come before us is very considerable. The whole House respects that, and I thank him for the assistance that he has given us—I speak from the Back Benches here—on all the Bills that have passed through in the time that I have been in here and before. Thank you very much indeed.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: It is right that we had a detailed discussion of this matter on Second Reading. I understand fully the concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, raised. I hope that I shall be able to clarify some of those points for him so as to make him a little more satisfied that the way in which he would like the provisions to work is in fact the case.
	As noble Lords know only too well, the clause creates an evidential presumption of intent to supply when the defendant is found to be in possession of a particular amount of a controlled drug. The effect is that when the presumption applies, a court or jury must assume that the defendant intended to supply the drug in his possession. However, I invite noble Lords to cast an eye at the second part of Clause 2, because insufficient regard has been paid to it. The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, referred to new subsection (4A) of the Misuse of Drubs Act 1971, but that must be read in conjunction with new subsection (4B), which says:
	"Subsection (4A) above does not apply if evidence is adduced which is sufficient to raise an issue that the accused may not have had the drug in his possession with that intent".
	So it is a rebuttable, not an absolute, presumption.
	The clause places an evidential presumption, rather than a legal burden of proof, on the defendant. The presumption is rebutted when evidence is adduced which raises an issue or arguable case that the defendant did not intend to supply the drugs in his possession. If such evidence is raised, the prosecution will be required to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to supply the drugs in his possession.
	I know that noble Lords have expressed concern regarding the fact that the Joint Committee on Human Rights found that it was unable to reach a definitive view whether the evidential presumption placed on defendants to an offence of possession with intent to supply controlled drugs was compatible with the convention. That was because the Joint Committee had not been informed of the prescribed amounts of drugs that would trigger the application of the statutory assumption. Those amounts will be provided in regulations subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
	The Joint Committee has emphasised that the convention will require there to be a sense of proportion in the amounts which are prescribed by regulation, vis-à-vis the seriousness of the offence of possession with intent to supply controlled drugs. We are very mindful that any levels to be prescribed by regulations with a view to triggering the statutory assumption must be appropriate, reflect and be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence.
	We believe that consultation with a range of bodies which have expertise in the field of drugs is essential to ensure that the particular levels prescribed are appropriate. In another place, the Minister responsible for drugs undertook to consult the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs as well as a range of other people, including the Forensic Science Service, the police and the Crown Prosecution Service. Other bodies that will be consulted will include the Department of Health, the National Treatment Agency, the Association of Chief Police Officers, and non-governmental organisations working in the drugs field. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, that that is important, because it deals with his point about where to draw the line between the users and abusers and those who actually enforce. We believe that we should listen to everyone on that matter, in order to get it right.
	Any levels prescribed by regulations must be debated by both Houses under the affirmative resolution procedure. We consider that such consultation and debate will provide the necessary transparency and safeguards and will assist us in securing prescribed levels that are indeed proportionate. The need for the thresholds to be agreed by affirmative resolution of both Houses will give noble Lords the opportunity to scrutinise the thresholds which it is proposed to adopt. I anticipate that we will be in a position to bring forward such a resolution late in 2005 or early in 2006.
	To give an indication—and it is only an indication—of what these thresholds might be, the level set out in an informal agreement reached between one police force and the CPS locally regarding when a charge of possession with intent to supply is appropriate are: in relation to heroin, bulk 7 grams or more, or 10 separate 0.1 gram wraps or more; with crack cocaine, bulk 7 grams or more, or 10 separate 0.1 gram rocks or more; with cocaine, bulk 7 grams or more, or 10 separate 1 gram or 0.5 gram wraps; and ecstasy, 10 tablets or more. Finally, for cannabis resin the relevant figure is 112 grams or more or 10 individual pieces or more. For the leaf it is 0.5 kilograms or more or 20 individual bags or more. That gives an idea of what one police force has done to approach this matter. However, I need to make clear that when we tackle this matter it will not just concern local protocol. The process will take into account all the medical and other evidence and try to establish a measure that will apply right across the board.
	However, I should emphasise the importance that consultation will have regarding where we finally end up. The purpose of this clause is to achieve greater consistency right across the country on when a defendant is charged with possession with intent to supply; clarify the point at which the quantity of drugs in a person's possession becomes above and beyond that reasonably held for personal use; increase the success in convicting dealers and disrupt the activity of dealers. It is on that basis that I move that Clause 2 stand part of the Bill.

Lord Mancroft: For the Committee's convenience I should point out that Amendment No. 1 is grouped with Amendments Nos. 3, 5 and 9.
	I was going to start by apologising for tabling these amendments so late last night that your Lordships did not get a sight of them until today—that was until I discovered that the government amendments were laid even later; this morning.
	I remind the Committee that we had Second Reading of this Bill on Monday as I believe that no one was aware that it was taking place. Only three Back-Benchers were able to speak and all three of them were pretty much opposed to the Bill. It was not at that stage moved into Committee; in fact, it was not referred to a Committee of your Lordships until a short while ago. I am not quite clear why we are now having to go through this because it is not exactly news that the election is coming. We have known about it for some time.
	I believe that I have never heard of a Bill coming through the wash-up stage—which is entirely a Front Bench process and nothing to do with us poor old foot soldiers on the Back Benches—that has not been at least moved into a Committee and has not had any scrutiny at all in this House. It is not an urgent Bill. If it was urgent, it should have come forward earlier in the Session. Therefore, it is rather undesirable for the noble Baroness to point out the desirability of having consultation. A number of organisations that I know well would have liked to offer briefing on this Bill. We Back-Benchers need and appreciate those briefings on many different subjects. However, we have not had the opportunity to receive those briefings on this Bill. It is an extremely unsatisfactory way to proceed on a controversial and difficult Bill.
	Clause 3(5) to the person—rather than defendant at this stage as he or she has not been charged—not being able to refuse what is called a "drug offence search" without good cause. Clause 3(5)(a) states that,
	"the court, in determining whether there is a case to answer;
	(b) a judge, in deciding whether to grant an application"—
	and, most importantly of all,
	"(c) the court or jury, in determining whether that person is guilty . . . may draw such inferences from the refusal as appear proper".
	Therefore, I very shortly ask two questions. What is good cause? What inferences from the refusal appear or do not appear to be proper to draw? More importantly, how is the person to know what is good cause and what inferences can properly be drawn? I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, confined his comments to a very narrow compass. Therefore, I shall respond in like terms. The real focus of Clause 3 is what the jury is supposed to infer.
	As the noble Lord knows, Clause 3 introduces in England and Wales—and Clause 4 similarly introduces in Northern Ireland—the requirement that the suspect's written consent is obtained prior to the intimate search being carried out. Detainees must be informed that an intimate search has been authorised and the grounds for it. The authorisation for the search, the grounds for it and the giving of the appropriate consent must be recorded in the custody record.
	The clause also allows a court or jury to draw such inferences as appear proper should consent to an intimate search be refused without good cause. Where there is good cause, no such inference will be drawn. By way of example, a pregnant prisoner may well have good cause for refusing to consent to an intimate search. Cultural sensitivities will also be relevant when determining what constitutes good cause. Often it will be a question of fact which will pertain to the particular case. Similarly, some drug dealers will swallow drugs suitably wrapped upon their arrest to conceal evidence.
	Clause 5 with regard to England and Wales, and Clause 6 with regard to Northern Ireland, enable a police officer of at least the rank of inspector to authorise an X-ray or ultrasound scan of a person arrested for an offence where he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person has swallowed a class A drug which he had in his possession with intent to supply or with intent to export unlawfully. Any charge made by the National Health Service would be met by the police.
	We tabled a government amendment this morning. The relevant amendment that we tabled is only a technical amendment which related to the SOCA Bill and staff custody officers. We waited until the subject was discussed yesterday before tabling the amendment. Had the outcome of the SOCA Bill been different, our amendment would also have been different. We finished consideration of the SOCA Bill today. We had to wait until those issues were dealt with before tabling our amendment. All the matters that are before the Committee are properly before it in accordance with the matters outlined at Second Reading earlier this week.
	As with Clauses 3 and 4, Clauses 5 and 6 require that the suspect gives his written consent to an X-ray or ultrasound scan being carried out. The suspect must be informed that such a procedure has been authorised and the reason for that authorisation. As with Clauses 3 and 4, should a person withhold consent for such a procedure without good cause, a court or jury may draw such inferences as it sees fit. The whole purpose of Clauses 5 and 6 is to give the police an indication of the need to detain someone to allow drugs to pass through their body.
	The Committee will have noted that Clause 8 has some relevance to Clauses 5 and 6. It introduces the power for magistrates to remand into policy custody for an extended period upon charge a person suspected of swallowing a drug. The purpose of Clauses 3, 4, 5 and 6 together is to enable those in possession of controlled drugs with the appropriate criminal intent to be brought to justice by deterring those who conceal them in a body cavity or swallow them from withholding consent for the appropriate procedure without good cause, and enabling courts and juries to act should they do so.
	Appropriate intent means for these purposes having possession of controlled drugs with intent to supply them or to export them unlawfully; in other words, the provisions are targeted at drug dealers not drug users. Amendments Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 9 seek to remove the provision for courts and juries to draw such inferences as appear proper from a refusal without good cause. The effect would be to allow those seeking to conceal evidence of possession of a class A drug to do so by refusing consent to an intimate search, X-ray or ultrasound scan without consequence. Hence, it would maintain a loophole that the police have identified to us as one used by dealers to frustrate justice. It is for that reason that we cannot support the amendments.
	I hope that I have said enough to explain to the noble Lord why the provisions are proportionate, will be necessary, and can be dealt with perfectly properly.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I hear what the noble Lord is saying, but I assure him that he is being unduly pessimistic about how the provisions will work. The groups of amendments from Amendment No. 10 to Amendment No. 30 seek to reduce the impact of the provisions contained in Part 3 of the Bill, which require those who have tested positive—that is the most important thing, that they have tested positive for class A drugs—to attend an initial assessment and, where required, a follow-up assessment. That is the condition precedent. We are not talking about someone who has not taken the drug or has nothing to do with it; they must have tested positive if the process is to apply to them.
	If the amendments were accepted, the provisions would apply to fewer individuals and fail to target those who may only be starting on the road of drug misuse and crime. The noble Lord has an interest in making sure that those who have become or may become addicted to drugs have as early a point of reference to help and support as possible. The provisions very much help that to take place.
	Amendment No. 10 would mean that the analysis would have to reveal that a specified class A drug was actually present before a police officer could require a person to attend an initial assessment and stay for its duration. Let me explain what happens with a testing on charge under Section 63B of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; we envisage that it will continue if Clause 7—it is on testing for the presence of class A drugs on arrest—is enacted.
	The technology used in the police custody suites is a screening tool and will reveal the presence of all opiates rather than the specified class A drug of diamorphine—heroin. That is because, currently, no test is available that can be economically and reliably used to test for heroin alone. It is therefore possible that, under the current testing regime, legitimate drugs within the opiate range such as codeine may be detected when using the on-site police custody test. However, should that be the case or if a person challenges the result, the test sample can be sent to the Forensic Science Service for a forensic analysis to provide a conclusive result using the "gold standard" test provided by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry—GC/MS.
	To accept the amendment would mean that all test samples would have to be sent for the further analysis before the requirement were imposed. That would be costly and delay the police imposing the requirement to attend an assessment for no obvious benefit. Currently, under the testing on charge, only 3 per cent of tests are challenged and sent for the further analysis. Of those challenges, only 4.4 per cent are upheld. We will issue guidance which provides that, where a person challenges the result of a drug test at the time of the test, the assessment will not be scheduled until after the results of the further analysis are received. Where the further analysis is negative, the obligation to attend the assessment will cease. That will prevent innocent people being assessed in the way in which the noble Lord fears.
	On the basis of that explanation, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Mancroft: I am grateful for that explanation. As I said—and we have said twice tonight, I think—early diagnosis and early intervention are extremely important. This is an extremely difficult issue. I raise it because it is causing considerable difficulty in the field. There are too many inappropriate referrals, and they are fantastically disruptive when they do happen, as I have said to staff and other clients.
	We have not yet got this right. Definition is very important and very difficult: the difference between abusers and misusers, and addiction and dependence. It is very confusing. Quite a number of pieces of legislation, whether they are inspired by the Department of Health or the Home Office, cross over, and occasionally definitions change, which causes immense problems. Most of them started wrong and got wronger, though over the years they have been getting slightly righter.
	If the noble Baroness reads tomorrow what she said today, I think she will find that the swapping of those words and the meanings that are attached to them by different people in different spheres, whether in the criminal justice system, the healthcare system or the social services system, is one of the problems. I would urge the Government to look at that very carefully. However, this propensity to "misuse" strikes me as an extremely dangerous route to go down. I think that we should view it with very great care. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Mancroft: Amendment No. 23, which is grouped with Amendments Nos. 24, 28 and 29, is merely intended to raise the issue of the size of the penalties in the Bill. In my amendments, I replace those penalties with other ones. I do not know whether they are right; I am not a great expert on the level of offences. But it seems to me that a year in prison or, I believe, a £4,000 fine at level 4 is slightly high for what is effectively missing an appointment, although it may be a very important appointment.
	Under these charges, a great many people will be arrested for acquisitive crime, mainly to fund their drug habits—even the dealers. We are not talking about the "Mr Bigs" of this world; we are talking about small-time dealers, and basically most of them supply drugs to fund their own habits. The reason for that is that they do not have any money. How will they pay these fines? Unless they are lucky enough to be in one of the few, but admittedly increasing, number of prisons that have good drug programmes, the likelihood is that they will end up with a worse habit when they come out than when they went in.
	Standing back from this issue, such people are stealing only because the drugs are so expensive, although they are far cheaper than they used to be. The reason they are so expensive is that they are illegal, which is government policy. Those who steal are arrested and end up being fined. They cannot pay the fine and so they go to prison—for which we have to pay and which probably makes them worse—and they come out and do it again.
	The object of this legislation—one with which I think everyone in your Lordships' House and beyond would agree—is to try to stop what we called the "revolving door syndrome". My concern is that if people are fined at too high a rate or if they are chucked into prison—obviously the object of the Bill is to stop them going to prison—then the revolving door syndrome is perpetuated.
	Therefore, in raising this point, I am questioning whether the level of fine and potential sentencing to prison is proportionate to the offences involved in this piece of legislation. I beg to move.

Lord Cobbold: The Bill has many problem areas, as the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, so ably pointed out. Clause 21 has the air of having been slipped in at the last minute, and its removal would have no influence on the rest of the Bill. The clause seeks to classify so-called magic mushrooms as class A drugs alongside heroin, crack and cocaine.
	Magic mushrooms grow wild all over the fields of England and have been enjoyed recreationally for many years. It is true that they contain a quantity of the substance psilocin, which in its pure and concentrated form is already classified as a class A drug in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. But experience tells us that the mushrooms themselves have a low danger to health relative to most other commonly used drugs and according to the Government's Talktofrank website, they are,
	"not addictive in any way".
	As I said at Second Reading on Tuesday, the point at issue is to what extent any government have the right in a free society to interfere in the personal choices of individual citizens and, with the excuse of protecting their health, to impose criminal sanctions on anyone who disobeys the rules? Government have every right and indeed a duty to educate and to warn the public, particularly the young, of the risks to personal health of all drugs, including alcohol and tobacco. Indeed, the campaign against smoking in recent years is a good example of what can be achieved by publicising potential harm to health.
	Publicity and health warnings are one thing, but criminalising the enjoyment of a relatively harmless mushroom that grows wild in our fields is surely a step too far. Are farmers to become criminals because class A drugs grow on their land? That is absurd. The clause will drive the existing, modest trade underground and into the hands of criminals, and it will increase the burden on the already overstretched criminal justice system. I hope that the Government will agree to drop Clause 21 from the Bill.

Lord Selsdon: I support the noble Lord, Lord Cobbold, for reasons that he may find hard to determine. I stand here to make a plea on behalf of the mushroom hunter. I have already disclosed my interest as a peasant farmer in France and a wine grower.
	I want to refer to the rather improper remarks made by my noble friend Lord Mancroft on the subject of wine. I carry large quantities of wine in cars and trucks, and I sell it. Of course, when wine is in the grape, with maybe 14 degrees alcohol, it is not treated as alcohol or wine and regarded as dangerous. Wine and mushrooms go well together. Noble Lords will know that you may not shoot a wild boar during the hunting season when the grapes have not been picked. There is a relationship in the land that I have between the wild boar and the mushroom hunter. The hunters who hunt the wild boar hunt with guns. The hunters who hunt the mushroom remember the old adage that there are bold mushroom hunters, old mushroom hunters but no old, bold mushroom hunters. The mushroom is a very dangerous creature. There are over 2,000 of them. Will the Minister kindly let me how many of them contain psilocin?
	The Destroying Angel is a mushroom that bothers me. It is far more dangerous than the magic mushroom. I understand that in the United Kingdom there are about five different types of magic mushroom. They are only treated as class A drugs once they have been processed. There are problems with the difference between Jack o' lantern and Slippery Jack: I have forgotten which of those is deadly poisonous and which is not. We all may know of cepe, morel and chanterelle mushrooms and that their value is considerable. There has been a tremendous growth in mushroom hunting throughout Europe, including the United Kingdom, with groups from Switzerland, Austria and France coming over into certain parts of the world. It is a secretive business because the value of cepe mushrooms or others is very high.
	I have a fear that if the Bill goes through, as is, genuine mushroom hunters may well pick up a mushroom or a fungus that is full of psilocin and thus commit a criminal offence. That matter is solved in many countries. Mushrooms are so deadly and dangerous that unless you are a competent person you cannot tell the difference. So normally you would pick them using surgical gloves. Poisonous mushrooms must never touch non-poisonous mushrooms, otherwise they will pollute them. You would take the mushrooms to the local pharmacist who will say "Yes, no, yes, no" and tell you how to cook them. In the United Kingdom, we do not have that knowledge. Is the Minister concerned in any way that the provision may offend against the European Convention on Human Rights? Is she concerned about protecting mushroom pickers? Does she or her department know anything at all about mushrooms?

Lord Rea: My noble friend said at Second Reading that magic mushrooms could have damaging, hallucinatory effects equivalent to those of LSD. That is certainly not my clinical experience. LSD can cause alarming hallucinations that may have lasting effects. But I have never met anyone who has come to any harm from the use of magic mushrooms. The house in which I used to live when my boys were growing up backed on to Hampstead Heath. They frequently went on magic mushroom foraging expeditions with their friends. Neither they nor their friends had anything other than pleasurable experiences as a result.
	I shall cite an e-mail that I received from a probation officer recently. Other noble Lords may have had the same message. It states:
	"Being a probation officer, I have helped people who have been addicted to alcohol, ecstasy, cannabis, heroin and crack. But I never met a person who has been addicted to magic mushrooms. They are totally non-addictive and grow naturally. Why ban them?"
	Indeed, following up what the noble Lord, Lord Cobbold, said, how can you ban something that grows naturally on UK soil?
	My noble friend also said in her speech that clarifying the status of fresh magic mushrooms as a controlled drug will, "we hope"—she said—decrease the trade. I suggest that that is unlikely to occur. In fact, the trade will go underground into criminal hands; the strength will probably be increased and unknown. As both the noble Lords, Lord Mancroft and Lord Cobbold, said, it will occupy police time unnecessarily, as is the case with other controlled drugs. As other noble Lords have said, it would do no harm just to drop the clause, if the Government must have the Bill.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey: moved Amendments Nos. 73 to 78:
	Page 168, line 12, leave out "authority" and insert "force"
	Page 168 , line 22, at end insert—
	"The Charity Commission
	The Financial Services Authority"
	Page 168, leave out lines 23 and 24.
	Page 168, line 24, at end insert—
	"The Director General and staff of the National Crime Squad
	The Director General and staff of the National Criminal Intelligence Service"
	Page 168, line 27, at end insert—
	"PART 2A
	Sport Governing Bodies
	The England and Wales Cricket Board Limited
	The Football Association Limited
	The Football Association of Wales Limited
	The Horseracing Regulatory Authority
	The Lawn Tennis Association
	The Irish Football Association Limited
	The Jockey Club
	The National Greyhound Racing Club Limited
	The Professional Golfers' Association Limited
	The Rugby Football League
	The Rugby Football Union
	The Scottish Rugby Union
	The Scottish Football Association Limited
	UK Athletics Limited
	The Welsh Rugby Union Limited"
	Page 169, line 10, at end insert—
	"1A Where by virtue of an enactment the use that may be made of information supplied by a person or body listed in this Schedule is restricted, or where the information may be further disclosed only with the consent of the person or body which provided the information, the prohibition or restriction on further disclosure shall apply to—
	(a) the supply of information by virtue of this Act, and
	(b) the supply of information to the Gambling Commission (whether or not by virtue of this Act)."
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.
	Clauses 30 to 34 agreed to.
	Clause 35 [Territorial application]:

Lord Faulkner of Worcester: There are in the Chamber at this late hour five members of the Joint Scrutiny Committee that looked at the draft gambling Bill. Noble Lords will recall that that Bill is very different from the one that we are approving today.
	The committee was completely united on the need for new gambling legislation, the establishment of the Gambling Commission and new regulations to take account of the changes in technology that have occurred since the last occasion on which Parliament reviewed the law on gambling. If the price of getting that legislation is that there must be fewer casinos than the Government would have preferred, it is worth paying.
	There was considerable unease in the joint scrutiny committee about the prospect of a free market applying to where the new large regional casinos should be located. One of the ironies of the free market argument was that, if there were to be a significant number of regional casinos elsewhere in the north-west, the one place where one would not finish up was Blackpool. The circle has now turned completely, and it seems very probable that the process that the Government are setting up will come to the logical conclusion that Blackpool is the right place.
	I do not intend to repeat the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Blaker, although I agreed with every word of it. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, is right to say that there is substantial opposition in the town. Certainly, the Joint Scrutiny Committee was satisfied by the strength of support that we found at all levels—from councillors and elsewhere.
	It is interesting that the press release put out by the Conservative Party earlier this week in the name of Mr John Whittingdale states:
	"We have . . . told the Government that we will accept the establishment of just one regional casino as a prototype, in order to assess its impact. Its location should be a leisure resort where the regeneration potential is greatest. The case for locating such a casino in Blackpool is very strong".
	I do not disagree with that. I do not expect my noble friend to comment on it, but I am sure that the team of wise people that he sets up will take account of what the Conservative Party have said, what the leader of the Liberal Democrat Peers said so forcefully earlier and what a number of other Members of this House have said in favour of giving Blackpool the opportunity to prove whether or not regeneration can be achieved through casino development.
	The Government are sensible to agree, through the usual channels, to allow that to happen. It is crucial that we pass the Bill tonight. I commend the work that my noble friend Lord McIntosh has done in that respect.

Baroness Buscombe: First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, for his kind words about the so-called deal that has been struck. We certainly have some sympathy on these Benches for what the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, has said about the wash-up. In many senses, it is not satisfactory, but the truth is that we have a Prime Minister who has chosen to go the country after fewer than four years of this Parliament.
	Right from the start, the Bill has been treated as a tail-end Charlie. Tonight is no exception. It was known this morning that this is the one Bill that is now uncontentious and widely acceptable, yet we are put on last, having seen all the contentious Bills taken first. Sometimes I question whether the Government feel that this legislation really is a priority.
	We have always made it clear that we support much in the Bill, in particular the establishment of the Gambling Commission and the regulation of remote gambling. Those issues have been largely uncontentious. We also agree with noble Lords who have said tonight that it is important that these measures reach the statute book as soon as possible. To that extent, we are pleased to have reached the stage where we shall see the Bill pass.
	On regional casinos, we have felt strongly about this from the start. I said at Second Reading words to the effect that the question of the number of regional casinos was almost irrelevant because it is to be a complete shot in the dark. We are talking about a huge cultural step change in considering regional casinos in the form of resorts or leisure facilities—whatever they may be called. This is a very different cultural concept from anything we have experienced hitherto in this country. So, after much thought and consideration and taking into account all that has been said in both Houses in the brief time we have had to debate the matter, along with the extensive input from beyond your Lordships' House, we feel that this precautionary measure should be taken. I use the words of the Minister in agreeing that we should begin with the cautionary measure of having one test case. We are grateful that the Government have conceded and accepted that approach. The deal will allow this Bill to go through.
	I want to add my support to all noble Lords who have referred to Blackpool. I was keen to echo the words of my honourable friend Mr John Whittingdale, who I see is here with us, but that has already been done for me by the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, to whom I am extremely grateful. Of course it is not for us to dictate which town or city should be lucky enough to have this opportunity, if they deem it right. But I have to say that Blackpool has made an extraordinarily strong case. We have always said, as have the Government, that the priority must be regeneration. The case for locating a casino in an established leisure resort away from the doorstep seems entirely sensible.
	I want to respond to the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, who suggested that perhaps people would be dancing in the streets of Blackpool tonight. I have to say to the noble Lord that only a short while ago I spoke to the chief executive of Blackpool Council who made it absolutely clear that whatever is said tonight in your Lordships' House, the people of Blackpool are not complacent. There is no question about that. They know that this is not in the bag and that a job has to be done. But it is clear that Blackpool representatives have worked hard to persuade noble Lords and others that the resort has a strong case. Indeed, that case has been strengthened by my noble friends Lord Blaker and Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville.
	I want to put one question to the Minister. He said that under the affirmative order, it would be possible to introduce more regional casinos. I believe he said that it would not be ruled out at a later stage to provide for additional casinos by affirmative order. On what basis would those additional casinos be introduced? Is it a question of demand, in which case what kind of tests will be used to assess it? Can the Minister reassure us that they will not be introduced as the result of pressure put on the Government by commercial companies or local authorities? Given the speed with which this Bill is passing through all its stages, we want to feel comfortable that all the necessary considerations and consultations will be taken carefully into account to ensure that the test case has proved successful and that the impact has not been derogatory.
	At this point I am looking straight at the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, who I know feels as strongly as I do about child protection. I strongly support the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwell in relation to the need to consider the issues of child protection and problem gambling. The social impact is of crucial importance. It was the priority of our debates on the first day in Committee and I wish to question the Minister briefly on that point.
	That is all I have to say in relation to regional casinos. However, I wish to respond briefly to the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, in regard to identification for entry into gaming areas. The noble Baroness knows that I felt strongly enough about this issue to bring forward an amendment on the first day in Committee and to press it to a vote. That was not easy because the Minister was seeking to reassure me in Committee that the amendment was not necessary. However, I felt that it was necessary—I do not regret it—and I am grateful that the amendment was passed.
	That said, however, since then the Minister has persuaded me that we should accept Amendment No. 243A in lieu of our amendment. I hope the Committee will support me in that. I have considered the amendment with care and I have heard what the noble Baroness has said. Her concern perhaps is that what the Minister has said in relation to the amendment does not add up to what is stated in the amendment itself.
	After much thought, I have decided that we should accept the amendment because, in a sense, it is rather more flexible in regard to supervision and what may be introduced in the years to come. The test case regional casino will not be established for some years, by which time it is hoped and assumed that technology will have developed such that the wording of our amendment perhaps might be otiose or anachronistic. Methods of testing individual identification in order to check age will have improved, and I have decided that we should be sensible and leave it to the Gambling Commission to "watch that space". It is mandatory that it should consider and issue one or more codes of practice in regard to access to casino premises for children and young persons. I hope that begins to clarify the point.
	That is all I have to say. We are grateful for the concessions that the Government have made. However, when we are in government—which will be following the election—I can reassure the Committee here and now that we will proceed with care with this legislation when it is put in place.